The Survey Reading Of Kashmir Conflict

THE KASHMIR CONFLICT: WHY IT DEFIES SOLUTION

Author(s): Rathnam Indurthy and Muhammad Haque

Source: International Journal on World Peace , MARCH 2010, Vol. 27, No. 1 (MARCH 2010), pp. 9-44

Published by: Paragon House

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/20752914

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at https://about.jstor.org/terms

is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to International Journal on World Peace

This content downloaded from ������������154.59.124.232 on Tue, 15 Sep 2020 01:27:55 UTC�������������

All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

THE KASHMIR CONFLICT: WHY IT DEFIES SOLUTION

Rathnam Indurthy Muhammad Haque

Professor of Government Assistant Professor of Sociology

McNeese State University 4205 Ryan Street

Lake Charles, Louisiana 70609 USA

Rathnam Indurthy, Ph.D, a native of India, has been at McNeese State University since 1989. He teaches international politics, U.S. foreign policy, and Middle East politics. He has published on the domestic politics of India and Pakistan, Indo-American relations, Indo-Pakistani relations and the Middle East.

Muhammad Haque, Ph.D, originally from Bangladesh, teaches in the areas of demography, medical ethics, and economic development. He has published on population growth and economic development in Bangladesh.

The Kashmir conflict is the major source of tension between India and Pakistan. Each controls a portion of Jammu and Kashmir which is divided along the line of control (LoC). They have fought three wars and developed nuclear weapons as a result of this conflict.

This article describes the conflict that developed with the British partition of India and why a peaceful solution has been so difficult to attain.

The authors list eleven proposed solutions and why none of them are completely acceptable to all sides. In they end they suggest why a continuation of the status quo is likely the only peaceful way forward.

Since the partition of British India and Pakistan in August 1947, the Kashmir dispute between the two countries has become an intractable one. They fought four wars in 1947,1948,1965, 1971 (Kashmir was peripheral to the independence of Bangladesh), and the Kargil war in 1999 but have failed to resolve the conflict so far. So, the pur pose of this article is first, to present a brief history of the conflict, second, to discuss the peace process known as the composite dialogue launched between India and the Musharraf, the Gilani/Zardari regimes, and finally, to explain why the dialogue has failed to resolve the conflict between India

and the Musharraf regime and why the stalemate may continue even with democratically-elected Gilani/Zardari regime.

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL ON WORLD PEACE VOL. XXVII NO. 1 MARCH 2010 9

This content downloaded from ������������154.59.124.232 on Tue, 15 Sep 2020 01:27:55 UTC�������������

All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

THE KASHMIR CONFLICT: WHY IT DEFIES SOLUTION

A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE KASHMIR CONFLICT, 1947-PRESENT

When British India was partitioned into India and Pakistan, Hari Singh, the autocratic and unpopular Maharaja (king) of Kashmir and Jammu, a pre dominantly Muslim state, resisted the pressure to accede to either Pakistan or India, hoping to seek independence or autonomy from both countries. To buy time and to accomplish this goal, he signed a standstill agreement with Pakistan on August 16, 1947, and was seeking to sign a similar one with India. India refused, but following the partition, communal rioting erupted in Punjab between Hindus, Sikhs and Muslims as this state was divided between India and Pakistan. In September the rioting spilled into

Kashmir against Muslims. Muslim insurgents in Poonch in the

southwestern part of Kashmir, supported covertly by the Pakistani army with arms, transport, and men, rebelled against the King, and established their Azad (independent) Kashmir government. By October 22, 1947, the insurgents pushed themselves fifteen miles from the state’s capital, Srinagar. Alarmed by this invasion, Singh sought India’s assistance, but the latter refused to help him unless the king signed the Instrument of Acces

sion, a standard procedure under which other princely states had acceded to either India or Pakistan, which he signed. India agreed to his accession of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) to India, after it had been consented to by Sheik Abdullah, the secular and popular leader of the National Conference party (NC) of J&K of the state at that time.

Following Singh’s signing of the accord on October 27, the same day Indian armed forces entered Kashmir to repel the raiders. The local Mus lims, mostly members of the NC, provided the logistical support for the Indian troops. This intervention by India infuriated Pakistani Governor General Mohammed Ali Jinnah, the founder of Pakistan. On the evening of October 27 he ordered the British Lt. General Sir Douglas Gracey, the

Kashmir and Jammu, a predominantly Muslim state, resisted the pressure to accede to either Pakistan or India, hoping to seek independence or autonomy from both countries.

10 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL ON WORLD PEACE

VOL. XXVII NO. 1 MARCH 2010

This content downloaded from ������������154.59.124.232 on Tue, 15 Sep 2020 01:27:55 UTC�������������

All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

THE KASHMIR CONFLICT: WHY IT DEFIES SOLUTION

Source: From Map No. 4140 Rev. 3 Unted Nations, January 2004, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Cartographic Section

chief of the Pakistan army, to dispatch Pakistan regular troops into Kashmir.

But, persuaded by Field Marshall Auchinleck, the Supreme Commander of both India and Pakistan of the transition period, Jinnah withdrew his orders. However, in November, Jinnah sanctioned the transfer of military supplies to the invaders while also sending Pakistan regular troops into Kashmir to join the rebels early as “volunteers” though not admitting its direct involvement until July 1948.

As the fighting continued, on January 1,1948, on the advice of British Governor General Lord Mountbatten, though opposed by his Deputy Prime Minister Sardar Patel, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru lodged a complaint with the UN Security Council (UNSC) by invoking Articles 34 and 35 of the UN Charter (that call for pacific settlement of disputes) against

Pakistan, suspecting that it was behind the invasion. In the complaint, as it had already been pledged by Mountbatten in his letter to Singh, on

October 26, India reiterated its pledge of its conditional commitment to a “plebiscite or referendum under international auspices,” once the aggres sor, Pakistan, was evicted. This was a pledge which India later regretted,

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL ON WORLD PEACE VOL. XXVII NO. 1 MARCH 2010 11

This content downloaded from ������������154.59.124.232 on Tue, 15 Sep 2020 01:27:55 UTC�������������

All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

THE KASHMIR CONFLICT: WHY IT DEFIES SOLUTION

and which continues to haunt her until today. Following the passage of UNSC resolutions calling for conduct of a plebiscite in Kashmir, the UN commission on India and Pakistan (UNCIP) made several attempts to conduct a plebiscite during 1948 to 1958, but failed as India and Pakistan had disagreed on the conditions and modalities on the implementation of the UNSC resolutions.1

The stalemate, therefore, led to another short war provoked by Pakistan

on September 1, 1965 that lasted until September 22, 1965 when both parties agreed to a cease-fire as demanded by the UNSC. In January 1966, mediated by the Soviet Union, Prime Minister Lai Bahaddhur Shastri and President Ayub Khan of Pakistan met in the city of Tashkent (Republic of Uzbekistan) and signed the agreement known as the Tashkent Declaration

^ ^H agreeing to resolve the Kashmir dispute

Under the 1971 bilaterally without resorting to force.2 * Ai In 1971 India and Pakistan fought a agreement, both India ,. , . _ , . ,& ,,

and Pakistan amon third war in December over Bangladesh s an a is an, among independence (Kashmiir was peripherally Others, committed ^ connected) in which the latter was dealt themselves to settling a humiliating defeat. Here again, it was their differences through Pakistan’s Yahya Khan military dictator bilateral negotiations.” ship’s atrocities committed against the “”” ll B 11 1 1″ people of Bangladesh, followed by the

fleeing of ten million people from Bangladesh into India, that provoked India’s intervention. On July 2,1972 Mrs. Indira Gandhi signed the Simla agreement with Mr. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, first as President and later as Prime

Minister of Pakistan, after he succeeded General Yahya Khan in 1971. Under this agreement, both India and Pakistan, among others, committed themselves to “settling their differences through bilateral negotiations.” They also agreed that in “Jammu and Kashmir, the Line of Control (LoC) resulting from the ceasefire of December 17, 1971, shall be respected by both sides without prejudice to the recognized position of either side.”

The agreement became the basis for the renewal of official relations between the two countries thus ending any role either for the UNSC or outside powers.3 And with Sheik Abdullah of the NC finally having had accepted Kashmir as an integral part of India, on February 12, 1975, through the signing of the Kashmir Accord with India, it seemed as though

12 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL ON WORLD PEACE

VOL. XXVII NO. 1 MARCH 2010

This content downloaded from ������������154.59.124.232 on Tue, 15 Sep 2020 01:27:55 UTC�������������

All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

THE KASHMIR CONFLICT: WHY IT DEFIES SOLUTION

the dispute had hit the final death knell, the fact that he and his son Farooq

in succession had led the State as Chief Ministers by having been elected democratically, however flawed the election might have been. They both ruled the state from 1975-1989.4

It turned out to be an illusory peace. In fact the state plunged into a secessionist militancy in January of 1990 and continues on until today though at a declining level, with Pakistan’s active support and promotion. It was primarily highhandedness and chicanery adopted by Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and Farooq’s inept, corrupt, opportunistic leadership, and the fraudulent state legislative elections of 1987that led to the insurgency. The

alienation of the educated but unemployed youth prompted the otherwise quiescent Muslim community and contributed to the insurgency.5

As the insurgency intensified, the con- ^^mmm^mm^m^^l?^mm^

flict between India and Pakistan assumed ^s ^e insurgency the portents of nuclear encounter after intensifiedf the conf|ict they each exploded nuclear bombs in . – . . between India and May 1998. So, in early 1999 Pakistan’s ” mum aM” i t i. , ‘ A*’ \ xt cu r Pakistan assumed the and India s Prime Ministers Nawaz Sharif and Atal Behari Vajpayee respectively, Portents of nuclear genuinely sought to reduce tensions encoun*er after they between their two countries by signing each exploded nuclear the Memorandum of Understanding bombs in May 1998, (MOU) in Lahore, Pakistan, in Febru- ^”i^””^””^”^”””^ “”” ary 1999, by which they agreed to resolve the Kashmir dispute peacefully, and bilaterally.6 But Gen. Pervez Musharraf, as army chief, scuttled the peace process and engineered another mini-war called the Kargil War in May-June of 1999. Again, Pakistan provoked another war by sending the Mujahedeen fighters (Holy Islamic warriors) into the Indian-held Kargil region of Kashmir State. As the battle turned bloodier and more intense, and as victory soon turned in favor of India, the Clinton administration intervened and succeeded in persuading Sharif to withdraw the infiltrators

and the Pakistani regulars from across the LoC, although Gen. Musharraf, and his generals wanted to fight on.7

On October 12 the military, headed by Gen. Musharraf, ousted Sharif from power in a bloodless coup on the grounds that the latter had committed crimes against the country as well as the army. Gen Musharraf declared

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL ON WORLD PEACE VOL. XXVII NO. 1 MARCH 2010 13

This content downloaded from ������������154.59.124.232 on Tue, 15 Sep 2020 01:27:55 UTC�������������

All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

THE KASHMIR CONFLICT: WHY IT DEFIES SOLUTION

himself the Chief Executive besides being the Chief of Army. Sharif was tried and convicted and given a life sentence by Musharraf’s handpicked Anti-Terrorist Court (ATC). But mediated by the Clinton administration, Sharif was subsequently exiled to Saudi Arabia in December 1999 for a ten year period.

INDIA’S TENSE RELATIONS WITH THE MUSHARRAF REGIME, 1999 TO 2004

To reduce tensions in the aftermath of the Kargil War and find solution to the Kashmir conflict, Prime Minister Vajpayee and Musharrsaf held a summit

on July 14-16 at Agra (the home of the Taj Mahal) near New Delhi, but failed to resolve it. They, however, agreed to continue the dialogue.8 Despite

^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ their pledge to continue the dialogue, ^ . OAAO – it soon came to an abrupt halt, as the On January 12, 2002 in ., F ‘ , … _ Pakistani-based terrorist groups such as a national address, Gen. ? y ** ^ /T , , T . , ‘ the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LET) and the Jaish

Musharraf pledged that e_Mohammad (JEM), and other militant he would no longer allow outfits intensified ^ cross-border ter his Soil to be used for rorism even after Gen. Musharraf joined cross-border terrorism. the Bush administration in October 2001

” ” I I ,^ B to fight the Taliban and AI Qaeda (base) in Afghanistan.

To demonstrate that they were not intimidated by a US-Pakistani coali tion to fight them, the terrorists launched a suicide bomb that destroyed the

Kashmir’s state assembly building and killed 38 innocent civilians in it. The JEM took credit for this blast. This blast was followed by another deadly attack on the Indian parliament building on December 13 by members of the LET in which 40 people including five terrorists were killed as the parliament was in session. In response, to compel Gen Musharraf to stop cross-border terrorism and to show it meant business, the Vajpayee govern

ment took a series of retaliatory measures. For example, it cancelled rail and road links with Pakistan; it banned its airspace for Pakistani commercial air flights; it recalled its ambassador from Islamabad, and moved nearly 800,000 troops to the borders along the LoC. Alarmed by the potential threat of another Indo-Pakistani war, the Bush administration (and this at a time

14 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL ON WORLD PEACE

VOL. XXVII NO. 1 MARCH 2010

This content downloaded from ������������154.59.124.232 on Tue, 15 Sep 2020 01:27:55 UTC�������������

All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

THE KASHMIR CONFLICT: WHY IT DEFIES SOLUTION

when it was fighting terrorism in the neighboring Afghanistan) pressured Gen. Musharraf into breaking with the Jihadists.

In response, on January 12,2002 in a national address, Gen. Musharraf pledged that he would no longer allow his soil for cross-border terrorism, stressing that the issue of Kashmir “runs in our blood.”9 And soon after that he arrested 2,000 militants and their leaders, but many of them were released, including their leaders, by Pakistani courts on the ground that there was no credible evidence against them. However, cross-border terrorism did not stop as three terrorists reportedly belonging to the LET disguised in army fatigues killed 30 and wounded 48 at a place called Kaluchak located on the outskirts of Jammu by dashing into the army family quarters (most

of those killed were children and their mothers). This crime infuriated Vajpayee so much that he visited the soldiers along the tense frontiers in Kashmir and asked them to prepare for a “decisive battle” against terror ists, reportedly to attack 200 plus terrorist training camps located in the Pakistan-occupied Azad (freedom) Kashmir.

In response, on May 27, Gen Musharraf responded by warning India that “if war is thrust upon us we will respond with full might,” implying a threat of the use of nuclear weapons if his country were to lose in a con ventional war.10

As the military confrontation became more intense with increased exchange of artillery firing across the borders, calls from President George Bush and the Secretary of State Colin Powell, and visits by Deputy Secre tary Richard Armitage, and British Foreign Secretary Jack Shaw to India and Pakistan, helped to defuse tensions between the two countries. They successfully persuaded the leaders to avert war and also extracted a pledge from Gen. Musharraf that he would stop cross-border terrorism and shut down the training camps.11 Ironically, in an interview with a Time reporter

(July 1,2002), Gen. Musharraf reneged on his pledge made previously by saying that, “What I said is that there is no movement across the Line.” India lifted its ban on Pakistan’s commercial airline, withdrew its naval war

ships back to the port of Bombay, and withdrew troops from the border. However, it insisted that there would be no dialogue with Pakistan unless Pakistan completely stopped cross-border terrorism and handed over 20 hardcore terrorists to her for trial. But Pakistan did not respond to either of these demands.

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL ON WORLD PEACE VOL. XXVII NO. 1 MARCH 2010 15

This content downloaded from ������������154.59.124.232 on Tue, 15 Sep 2020 01:27:55 UTC�������������

All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

THE KASHMIR CONFLICT: WHY IT DEFIES SOLUTION

DEMOCRACY RESTORED IN KASHMIR IN OCTOBER 2002

In the throes of threats by terrorists that they would disrupt Kashmir’s state legislative elections, the Vajpayee government defied their threat and conducted fair and open elections in September-October 2002 in four phases. Although the separatist twenty-three party coalition, All Par ties Hurryat Conference (APHC), pressured by Pakistan, boycotted the elections and denounced them as sham, and although the terrorists killed more than a hundred and sought to disrupt the elections, 45 percent of the Kashmiris defied the threats and voted. Farooq Abdullah’s party (NC), the Indian Congress Party (ICP), the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), the

Peoples’ Democratic party (PDP) and six other separatist groups contested the elec tions. The Kashmiris rejected the ruling

NC, reducing its strength to twenty-eight out of a total of eighty-seven seats, while voting mostly for the ICP and the newly formed PDP.

The INC and PDP formed a coalition

government with PDP’s leader Mufti Mohammed Sayeed assuming the post of Chief Minister. On assuming office, Sayeed adopted a conciliatory policy of releasing all those militants who have been

imprisoned. To bring the militants back in to the mainstream society as part of his “healing touch policy,” he recommended to the central government that they be released provided they disavowed violence.12

On November 2, 2005, as per the previous coalition agreement, the state congress party leader Ghulam Nabi Azad succeeded Mufti as Chief

Minister of the Coalition Government. However, even with the restoration

of democracy in the State, terrorism continued. For example, on March 23,

2003, in a tiny Hindu village of Nandi-Marg in the Kashmir Valley’s Pul wama district, terrorists gunned down 24 of the 52 citizens of that village. Even then Mr. Vajpayee visited Srinagar on April 18, and in a huge public rally of 20,000 people, he stunned the Indians by extending the “hand of friendship” to Pakistan for dialogue and reconciliation. In response,

The Vajpayee government conducted elections in September October 2002 in four phases. The All Parties Hurryat Conference (APHC) boycotted the elections and denounced them as sham.

16 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL ON WORLD PEACE

VOL. XXVII NO. 1 MARCH 2010

This content downloaded from ������������154.59.124.232 on Tue, 15 Sep 2020 01:27:55 UTC�������������

All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

THE KASHMIR CONFLICT: WHY IT DEFIES SOLUTION

on April 28, Prime Minister Mir Zafarullah Jamal called Vajpayee on the telephone and invited him to visit Islamabad. On May 2 Vajpayee told the parliament that he wanted to start a “decisive and conclusive dialogue” with Pakistan to end the decades of hostility between the two countries. He also announced the renewal of diplomatic ties and renewal of air and land links with Pakistan on a reciprocal basis. On October 22,2003, India also declared its desire to open up a bus link between Srinagar, the capital of Kashmir, and Muzaffarbad, the capital of POK.13 On November 22, as Eid (the day of ending fasting) gesture, Jamal declared a unilateral cease fire, to which India agreed. Immediately thereafter, the guns fell silent on November 24, the LoC between the two states was extended to include the disputed Siachen glacier at the request of India.

On January 6, 2004, Vajpayee and ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ Musharraf, while attending the meeting of the South Asian Regional Cooperation ?n ?Ctober 22′ 2003′ _ (SARC), met on its sidelines in Islamabad, lnd,a dec,ared d?*sire

January 4-6, 2004, and issued an his- to ?Pen UP f bus ,ink toric joint statement in which Musharraf between Srinagar, the pledged to stop cross-border terrorism capital of Kashmir, and and, in return, Vajpayee agreed to engage Muzaffarbad, the capital in Kashmir talks with Pakistan.14 of POK.

COMPOSITE DIALOGUE LAUNCHED

The Congress-led coalition government headed by Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh, which succeeded the Vajpayee government in May 2004, pledged to proceed with the composite dialogue with the Mushar raf regime. The dialogue covered eight issues such as Siachen, Sir Creek,

Wuller barrage project, terrorism, economic, and commercial co-operation, and promoting friendly relations. The Kashmir conflict constituted the core

issue of the dialogue.15 In response to Musharraf’s proposal calling for the demilitarization of

both Kashmir states, as a peace gesture on November 11 2004, Dr. Singh announced the reduction of troops in the state of Kashmir. In his November

visit to the state, Dr. Singh announced a package of $5 billion to electrify all villages, build more roads, open six colleges and five training technical

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL ON WORLD PEACE VOL. XXVII NO. 1 MARCH 2010 17

This content downloaded from ������������154.59.124.232 on Tue, 15 Sep 2020 01:27:55 UTC�������������

All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

THE KASHMIR CONFLICT: WHY IT DEFIES SOLUTION

colleges.16 He also offered to talk to the APHC leaders unconditionally. His government permitted APHC leaders to visit Pakistan to consult with Pakistani leaders as well as the Kashmiri militant leaders living in exile. However, he made it abundantly clear that he was opposed to “redraw ing of the international borders, or any proposal which smacks of further division on religious lines.”17 The dialogue finally began in late 2004. For example, in early December 2004 as part of the first round talks, joint working groups of India and Pakistan met in New Delhi, Rawalpindi and Islamabad on different dates and held discussions on the issues covered

in the dialogue.18 On December 28, 2004, the groups held second round talks, and the parties agreed to resume rail links between Kokhrapar (Sindh,

Pakistan) and Munnabao (Rajasthan, India) which were suspended since 1965. They decided to meet again to fix the date of bus service linking Srinagar to Muzaffarabad (POK), and exchanged a draft of Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on cooperation to curb drug trafficking. They also agreed to future expert level talks on implementing nuclear Confidence Building Measures (CBM), and promoting regular contacts at people to people levels, including at designated places to explore further CBMS along the LoC. The working groups discussed modalities for carrying out the joint survey of the boundary pillars in the Sir Creek?the disputed river boundary between the countries. Foreign ministers, Natwar Singh and Mahamood Khurshid Kasuri of India and Pakistan respectively, joined the last meeting of the talks on December 27-28 held in Islamabad. The foreign ministers agreed to an early finalization of a draft agreement on the pre-notification of flight-testing of ballistic missiles by both countries. But the core Kashmir issue was not discussed.19

On February 16, 2005, External Minister Singh and his counterpart Kasuri met in Islamabad and achieved a breakthrough by agreeing to open a bus route on April 7 between Srinagar and Muzaffarabad so as to give an impetus to the peace process and enable the families of divided states to visit

each other’s families as part of the CBMs. They also agreed to open another

bus link between Sindh and Rajastan in February. Mr. Singh also met the new Prime Minister of Pakistan Shaukat Aziz and Musharraf and discussed

with them about moving the peace process. On April 17, as part of cricket diplomacy, Musharraf visited New Delhi, witnessed the match between India and Pakistan, and later held talks with Dr. Singh. Later they jointly

18 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL ON WORLD PEACE

VOL. XXVII NO. 1 MARCH 2010

This content downloaded from ������������154.59.124.232 on Tue, 15 Sep 2020 01:27:55 UTC�������������

All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

THE KASHMIR CONFLICT: WHY IT DEFIES SOLUTION

issued a statement agreeing to have normal trade and political relations, and

proceed with the peace process. They also agreed to open two more trade routes between Srinagar and Muzaffarabad across the LoC, and between Poonch and Rwalakot, Pakistan. At the press conference Prime Minister Dr.

Singh noted that the peace process was “irreversible” while acknowledg ing a “hard road ahead.”20 However, terrorists continued to attack India in order to disrupt the peace process. For example, on October 29,2005, on the eve of Dewali (the festival of lights), three blasts ripped through crowded markets in Delhi killing 69 and wounding more than 200 people. India implicated the LET. Musharraf condemned the attacks, and offered his condolences to the victims. Subsequently, the terrorists struck in vari ous Indian cities such as Varanasi, Bangalore, and Hyderabad. Even in the midst of these terror attacks third round hhh^mhhhuhhh talks were held between relevant specified Even in the midst of groups in New Delhi and Islamabad on these terror attacks different dates between January and June third round talks were

2006.They reiterated their commitment he|(, between re|evant to start bus service between Poonch, and a s? Mm., ^ , f t .if specified groups in New Rawalkot as had been previously agreed _ . . – , . . ^ , , i . Delhi and Islamabad on to. They also agreed to start truck service ^ dates between between Srinagar and Muzzaffarbad, and make rail links operational between Kho- January and June 2006. rarapar and Manabao. On Conventional and nuclear weapons, the groups agreed to strengthen CBMs. And on Sir Creek, they agreed to carry out a joint survey of the land in the Creek area,

and maritime boundary.21 But on July 11, 2005 terrorists struck again by causing suicide blasts

on the local passenger railway trains in Mumbai killing 200, and wounding more than 700 travelers. Immediately thereafter, Musharraf again offered his condolences, and pledged his cooperation in catching the culprits. India implicated the ISI, and suspended the dialogue with Pakistan. But the dialogue was put on track after Dr. Singh and Musharraf issued a joint statement creating Anti-Terror Institutional Mechanism on September 16, 2006 in which both countries pledged to cooperate to deal with terrorism when they met on the sidelines in Havana, Cuba at the summit meeting of the Non-Aligned Nations.22

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL ON WORLD PEACE VOL. XXVII NO. 1 MARCH 2010 19

This content downloaded from ������������154.59.124.232 on Tue, 15 Sep 2020 01:27:55 UTC�������������

All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

THE KASHMIR CONFLICT: WHY IT DEFIES SOLUTION

Perhaps to persuade India back to a negotiating table on the Kashmir issue, on August 1, 2006, Gen. Musharraf, in an interview with journalist

A.G Noorani, articulated his specific peace proposal that, among others, called for demilitarization, self-rule in both Kashmir states, and joint management of the states by both countries 23 On December 6, 2006, in an interview with the NDTV (India) Musharraf again reiterated the same proposal.24 On December 12, 2006, Pakistani foreign minister’s spokes woman, Tasmin Aslam, threw in a bombshell by telling the Pakistani media for the first time that under Article 257 of its 1973 constitution, Pakistan

never claimed Kashmir as an integral part of Pakistan. And on December 14, Foreign Minister Kasuri affirmed what she had stated. This statement upset many Pakistani politicians.25 On December 17,2006, on a flight back to New Delhi from Tokyo, Dr. Singh welcomed Musharraf’s proposal by saying, “If any new ideas come, we welcome them. And, I would like to say that in the last two and a half years, we have had very intensive dialogue with Pakistan.”26

DR. SINGH HOLDS TALKS WITH KASHMIRI GROUPS IN SEARCH OF A CONSENSUS.

Dr. Singh initiated talks with the Kashmiri groups to seek a consensus on the issue. He focused his attention on the internal political dynamics in Kashmir and held a series of round table conferences with groups of vary ing ideological orientations. For example, he invited separatists such as the

APHC headed by Mirwaz Umar Farooq and other non-separatist groups. Dr. Singh agreed to talk to the separatists unconditionally. In September 2005, he met with moderate leaders. In January 2006, he held talks with People’s Conference (PC) Chairman Sajjad Ghani and the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation (JKLF) Chairman Yasin Malik. In February 2005, Dr. Singh convened a conference in Srinagar.27 Although separatists had refused to take part, all other non-separatists attended it. It was followed by second and third round table conferences also held in Srinagar in May 2006 and April 2007 respectively.28 But the separatists again refused to attend them unless the talks were limited only to them, excluding those groups who supported the state’s integration with India. Dr. Singh also established five working groups or commissions to deal with various aspects

20 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL ON WORLD PEACE

VOL. XXVII NO. 1 MARCH 2010

This content downloaded from ������������154.59.124.232 on Tue, 15 Sep 2020 01:27:55 UTC�������������

All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

THE KASHMIR CONFLICT: WHY IT DEFIES SOLUTION

of the Kashmir problem including one dealing with center-state relations. On Musharraf’s Kashmir proposal, Dr. Singh also supported self-rule and eventual demilitarization of the state while he has been ambivalent about

joint-management of the two states. On the Sir Creek dispute, talks were held on December 22-23 and both

parties agreed to conduct a joint survey of this tidal channel. Accordingly, the teams completed the survey in March 2007 verifying the outermost points of the coastal line. Subsequently, talks were held in Rawalpindi on May 17-18 but they reached no agreement on this dispute. Similarly, water secretaries of India and Pakistan held talks over the Talbul/Wuller, a dispute since 1987, on June 22-23, 2006, and again on August 21-22 in New Delhi but failed to resolve it.29

On February 2,2007, Gen Musharraf hmhmhmmhhhm told the media that relations with India Qn Musharrafs Kashmir

should not become hostage to “confron- pr0posal, Dr. Singh also tationists” who are against the peace pro- supported self-rule and

cess, and that^our^”relations have never eventua| demi|itarj2ation been this good before in our history and … . A , & , . ?TT . i. j * of the state while he has we are happy about it. He indicated that “both sides have realized there could be been amb’va,en* ab?ut

no military solution to these disputes.”30 joint-management of the On March 16, 2007, addressing a four- two States, day 60th Formation Commanders confer ence held in Rawalpindi, Gen. Musharraf reiterated expressed optimism on the resolution of the Kashmir conflict, and that relations between India and Pakistan have “never been better.”31 The fourth round talks were held

in May 2007 but produced no tangible results. Given the complexity of the disputes, especially Kashmir, fearing that

the round of talks between the countries might not bring them closer to a resolution, both the Singh government and the Musharraf regime at the same time launched back channel secret negotiations to resolve these issues including the Kashmir dispute. As Steve Coll vividly describes, beginning in 2004, Musharraf’s classmate and bureaucrat Tariq Aziz on behalf of Pakistan, and a Russian specialist named Satinder Lambah on behalf of Singh’s government, launched secret non-paper negotiations (text without names or signatures so as to serve as deniable in the event the agreement

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL ON WORLD PEACE VOL. XXVII NO. 1 MARCH 2010 21

This content downloaded from ������������154.59.124.232 on Tue, 15 Sep 2020 01:27:55 UTC�������������

All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

THE KASHMIR CONFLICT: WHY IT DEFIES SOLUTION

became too controversial to sign) on Kashmir, and other issues dividing India and Pakistan. They met two dozen times in hotels between 2004 and 2007 at different places, and worked out the principles of agreement on Sir

Creek, and Siachen. And on Kashmir, they were working on making the LoC as “irrelavant” if not a dividing border as demanded by India while giving each state on either side of the border a measure of autonomy with

eventual demilitarization of both states.

But the secret talks eventually failed to bear fruit as the Musharraf regime began to encounter a myriad of political prob lems at home especially. We proffer some explanations as to why the Singh govern ment and the Musharraf regime could not resolve the Kashmir conflict and other

ancillary disputes notwithstanding, having held so many rounds of talks including the secret ones.

EXPLANATIONS FOR LACK OF SUCCESS:

Continued Cross-Border Terror was an Impediment to the Peace Process

Notwithstanding Musharraf’s pledges to end it, cross-border terrorism continued, albeit at a declining rate. The Pakistani military’s Kashmir policy

has been to engage India in a proxy war through the instrument of terror until India came to an amicable settlement with it over Kashmir. Ironically,

today, its policy is boomeranging against Pakistan itself. The fact is that the jihadists have been relentless in committing a series of suicide bomb ings since 2007, killing hundreds of people. As Dr. Navnita Behera notes, although fatalities and cross-border incidents in Kashmir decreased from 1,991 in 2004 to 1,509 in 2005, terror both in Kashmir proper and across India continued.32 The Frankenstein which the Pakistani military created to fight India has, ironically, has turned against its own country from early 2007 onward for its shortsighted policy. But the ISI has not abandoned its embrace of the jihadists to fight India.

Tariq Aziz on behalf of Pakistan, and a Russian specialist named Satinder Lambah on behalf of Singh’s government, launched secret negotiations on Kashmir.

22 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL ON WORLD PEACE

VOL. XXVII NO. 1 MARCH 2010

This content downloaded from ������������154.59.124.232 on Tue, 15 Sep 2020 01:27:55 UTC�������������

All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

THE KASHMIR CONFLICT: WHY IT DEFIES SOLUTION

Pakistan has become a hotbed as well as a epicenter for jihadists who have been engaging in worldwide terrorism. The Bush administration, which had offered more than $10 billion in aid for the regime’s cooperation for its war on terrorism, subsequently became skeptical about the regime’s commitment to fighting terrorism, given the resurgence of Taliban and Al-Qaeda attacks on the US-led NATO forces in Afghanistan. It is little wonder that President Hamid Karazai of Afghanistan openly accused the Musharraf regime for fostering terrorism against his country.33

The Need of the Military to Continue with the Conflict in order to retain its power.

With the exception of the rule under Prime Minister Zulfikkar Ali Bhutto

(1971-77), since 1958 the Pakistani military continued to intervene in the country’s politics directly or indirectly to retain its economic, political, and social interests. This involvement con

tinued even during the time democracy was reinstated. To retain its power and perks, the military never hesitated to manipulate conflict and tensions with India over Kashmir. Although Mr. Bhutto had gotten Article 245 included in the 1973 Constitution, declaring any attempt by the military to abrogate and subvert government treasonous, the military ignored this injunction. For example, Lt. Gen. Zia-ul-Haq and Gen. Musharraf, in utter disdain for this clause, staged a coup d’etat against democratically elected leaders Mr. Bhutto and Mr. Nawaz Sharif in July 1977 and October 1999 respectively, and imposed military dictatorships.

When Mr Bhutto (1973-77) and his daughter Benazir Bhutto (1988-90, 1993-96) and Sharif (1990-93, 1997-99) challenged the Punjab-domi nated military, it found an excuse to dismiss them from power by accusing

them of favoritism, nepotism and corruption before they completed their terms of office even though the dictators have been accused of the similar charges, but with no price to pay.

The ISI has not abandoned its embrace of the jihadists to fight India. Pakistan has become a hotbed as well as a epicenter for jihadists who have been engaging in worldwide terrorism.

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL ON WORLD PEACE VOL. XXVII NO. 1 MARCH 2010 23

This content downloaded from ������������154.59.124.232 on Tue, 15 Sep 2020 01:27:55 UTC�������������

All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

THE KASHMIR CONFLICT: WHY IT DEFIES SOLUTION

The military never allowed democratic institutions to take root in the country. In its lexicon, there has not been any intention to returning to barracks and subordinating itself to a civilian leadership. It has a stake in retaining its huge economic interests. In a review article of the book entitled

Military, Inc.: Inside Pakistanis Military Economy by Ayesha Siddiqa, Niru pama Subramaniam notes that the Pakistani military has built up a huge commercial empire which will make it very difficult to dislodge it from power.

She points out that its assets account for 10 percent of Pakistan’s GDP. In cahoots with businesses, the military, she further notes, dominates the three

sectors of the economy?agriculture, manufacturing and services operating at three levels?institutional, subsidiary and individual, involving billions of income for the military.34 At an individual level alone, Gen Musharaf placed

between 4,000-5,000 loyalist officers in various positions of authority.35 Dr.

Siddiqa points out that Gen. Musharraf did not grow up rich and he has accumulated land assets to the value of $10.34 million.36 He is an example of how the higher echelons of military accumulate wealth in Pakistan. This is attributed to its penetration of the country’s economy. However, the

military has to keep the Kashmir conflict aflame lest its power should be challenged by ordinary Pakistanis. India’s former Chief of Army, Gen. V.S. Sharma, in an interview to Sheela Bhatt of India Abroad (June 4, 1999), told her why the Pakistan Army needed to keep the Kashmir Conflict alive:

Pakistan’s survival depends entirely on their quarrel with India on Kash

mir, it is endemic to their livelihood. They control the nation: get the

best pensions, best jobs. The Military community in Pakistan is having

a damn good time at the cost of the poor people of Pakistan. How can they make peace with India.37

The Regime’s Lack of Political Legitimacy

Gen. Musharraf’s lack of political legitimacy became another impediment to achieving peace with India on the Kashmir conflict, which is of historical

significance and which needs a national consensus in Pakistan to resolve the conflict. For instance, as noted ealier, on October 12,1999, Gen. Musharraf ousted Sharif, a democratically elected Prime Minister, in a bloodless coup and seized power although under article 245 of the Pakistani constitution

24 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL ON WORLD PEACE

VOL. XXVII NO. 1 MARCH 2010

This content downloaded from ������������154.59.124.232 on Tue, 15 Sep 2020 01:27:55 UTC�������������

All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

THE KASHMIR CONFLICT: WHY IT DEFIES SOLUTION

it is treasonous to do that. To legitimize his praetorian rule, on April 30, 2002, he abruptly conducted a referendum asking the citizens if he should continue as president for another five years. But the election was fraudulent

and not even 15 percent had voted for him. In August 2002, Gen. Mush arraf issued the Legal Framework Order (LFO) encapsulating 21 clauses constituting as part of the 17th amendment to the constitution with the objective of not only legitimizing and indemnifying his coup, and holding a referendum, but also to legitimize his extraordinary powers.

In November 2003, supported by a coalition of six Islamic parties known as the Muttabide Majilis-e-Amal (MMM), an alliance he himself created, the new parliament led by the pro-Musharraf Pakistani Muslim League (PML-Q), which was elected in October 2002, approved these radical clauses as the 17th amendment on the pledge by Gen. Musharraf that he would give up his title as the Chief of Army by November 2004. He however, later reneged on his pledge. On October 6,2007, Gen. Mushar raf got himself re-elected as president by the Senate, National Assembly and four provincial assemblies. Challenges to the constitutionality of his reelection as president were rejected by the Supreme Court headed by Ifftikhar Chaudhary. Chaudhary was the chief justice whom Musharraf had suspended in March 2007 for asserting the court’s independence, but pressure from a lawyer’s movement got him reinstated in July 2007, a successful challenge to Musharraf’s total authority.38

Gen. Musharraf Declares Emergency Rule on November 3, 2007

Fearing a negative verdict on his October 6 reelection by the Chaudhary’s supreme court, on November 3,2007 Gen. Musharraf declared a state of emergency?a defacto martial law?by suspending the constitution. He issued another provisional constitutional order (PCO) under which he replaced Chaudhary, a thorn in his flesh, with suppliant Hameed Dogar. He also dismissed eight Supreme Court judges and scores of high court judges who refused to take the oath of office under his PCO. Gen. Musharraf

also closed private television networks, put in jail nearly 5,000 journalists, human rights and civil society activists, and politicians who challenged his emergency rule. He put Ms. Benazir Bhutto and Chaudhary under house arrest (she was later released, but not Chaudhary); they had demanded that

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL ON WORLD PEACE VOL. XXVII NO. 1 MARCH 2010 25

This content downloaded from ������������154.59.124.232 on Tue, 15 Sep 2020 01:27:55 UTC�������������

All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

THE KASHMIR CONFLICT: WHY IT DEFIES SOLUTION

he resign on the ground that he had no political legitimacy. Meanwhile, in the midst of severe criticism leveled against him by the Pakistanis, espe

cially the Pakistan bar association for clamping the emergency rule, Gen. Musharraf finally but reluctantiy let Nawaz Sharif, his nemesis, return to Pakistan. Sharif arrived in Lahore on November 26 to a huge welcome. On November 12, Musharaf announced elections for January 8, which were postponed to a later date, and on November 16, he appointed Moham median Soomro, the chairman of the Pakistan senate as Prime minister of the caretaker government until a new elected government was sworn in. On November 21, his handpicked Supreme Court Chief Justice Dower, dismissed all petitions challenging his election and the emergency rule, and declared his October election as valid. On November 22, Musharraf issued another ordinance validating and affirming the proclamation of emergency rule, and all other orders, ordinances, including the PCO he issued, and they were declared as constitutional by the supreme court.

After all domestic legal obstacles against him were cleared by Dower, the Bush administration and the Brown government of Great Britain pressured him to lift the emergency. And the 53-member Commonwealth also did the same by suspending the country from membership. On December 16, Gen. Musharraf reluctantly lifted the emergency and released most of the arrested persons with the exception of Chaudhary.39

Benazir Bhutto’s Assassination only Reinforced the Regime’s Lack of Political Legitimacy

Ms. Bhutto, a charismatic and popular leader, was assassinated in a gunfire attack-cum-suicide bombing on December 26 a few minutes after she had finished addressing an election rally, ironically in Rawalpindi, the military garrison city. The interior department spokesperson Javed Iqbal Cheema told journalists that there was “irrefutable evidence” linking the killing to the south Waziristan-based Taliban leader Beitullah Mehsud (on August 7, 2009 he has been killed in a CIA launched missile strike, New Tork Times, August 8,2009) although he denied that he had anything to do with it. But Bhutto’s supporters blamed the Musharraf regime for the tragedy. It was rumored that some Islamists facilitated by the ISI might have committed the crime. In an e-mail sent to her friend Mr. Mark Spiegel in the US on

26 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL ON WORLD PEACE

VOL. XXVII NO. 1 MARCH 2010

This content downloaded from ������������154.59.124.232 on Tue, 15 Sep 2020 01:27:55 UTC�������������

All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

THE KASHMIR CONFLICT: WHY IT DEFIES SOLUTION

October 26,2007, Ms. Bhutto put the blame squarely on Musharraf if she were to be assassinated. She also reportedly notified the British government

that she feared a plot to kill her. This belief only reinforced the Musharraf

regime’s lack of legitimacy among Pakistani citizens. However, at the urging

of the Musharraf regime, the Scotland Yard police conducted an investiga tion and released a report in February indicating that Ms. Bhutto had died of the impact of the blasts, and cleared the regime of any complicity. But her family and her party the PPP continued to implicate it.40

In the February parliamentary and state assembly elections, Musharraf’s

party, the PML (Q), was defeated, and the PPP and the PML (N) won, putting Musharraf’s’ rule in political jeopardy. The PPP asked Musharraf to exit peacefully on the ground that he lacked political legitimacy, while the PML (N) called for his impeachment.

Despite his apparent change of mind on the Kashmir issue, given his lack of political legitimacy, India has been skeptical of negotiating peace

with Musharraf on the dispute. India therefore, had hoped for restoration of democracy in Pakistan before it could seriously negotiate peace on the Kashmir conflict and other disputes. This belief by India is given some credence in that India achieved some tangible results with democratic governments in Pakistan in the past. For example, Mr. Bhutto signed the Simla Accord in 1972 with Mrs. Gandhi and reportedly told Mrs. Gan dhi that the LoC would be an international border.41 His daughter, Ms. Bhutto, signed two agreements with Mrs. Gandhi’s son, Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, in Islamabad. The first was not to attack each other’s nuclear installations and second to respect the Simla Accord,42 for which she was branded pro-India by the military. On May 25, 1999, in an address at the Woodrow Wilson International Center she admitted that she had to

be hostile toward India to appease the Punjabi-dominated military. She regretted not having engaged in dialogue with India.43 In 1997, Sharif and India signed a composite dialogue agreement, and in February 1999 he and Prime Minister Vajpayee signed the MOU to resolve the Kashmir conflict bilaterally.44 Musharraf opposed this and, as noted earlier, engineered the Kargil War of May-July 1999 to undermine growing Indo-Pakistan friendly relations. But the prospects of the Singh government and the democratic government have turned out to be equally bleak especially after the terrorist Mumbai attacks on November 26, 2008.

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL ON WORLD PEACE VOL. XXVII NO. 1 MARCH 2010 27

This content downloaded from ������������154.59.124.232 on Tue, 15 Sep 2020 01:27:55 UTC�������������

All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

THE KASHMIR CONFLICT: WHY IT DEFIES SOLUTION

THE PROSPECTS OF RESOLVING THE KASHMIR CONFLICT WITH CURRENT GOVERNMENT ARE EQUALLY BLEAK

Following the election of Yousuf Raza Gilani as Prime minister in March 2008, Singh’s government congratulated him on his election, and hoped for better relations with Pakistan by affirming its support for his democracy.

On May 20,2008, the External Affairs minister Pranab Mukherjee visited Islamabad and met with the Prime Minister, and the leaders of the PPP and

the PML (N), Asif Ali Zardari and Nawaz Sharif respectively, and President Gen. Musharraf. Mukherjee noted that he was visiting Islamabad to get a feel of the new democratic dispensation’s priorities and policies, and to affirm India’s commitment to dialogue.45 On May 21, Mukherjee and his counterpart, Makhhdoom Shah Mahmood Qureshi, issued a joint state ment noting that they had reviewed the progress report of the fourth round

of talks of topics covered under the composite dialogue, highlighted the bilateral achievements, and indicated that their foreign secretaries, Salman Bashir and Shiva Shankar Menon, were soon to launch a fifth round of talks in New Delhi in July 2008.46 But on the Kashmir issue the leaders began to express discordant opinions. For example, on May 11, 2008, Prime Minister Gilani characterized Gen.MusharafPs proposal on Kashmir as “half baked.” In March 2008, Zardari told an Indian TV Network, that Kashmir should not be allowed to “hijack” from improving trade and other relations between the two countries.

This statement by Zardari was swiftly disapproved by various groups in Pakistan. For example, the new army chief Gen. Ashfaq Pervez Kayani,

who assumed this position in October 2008, visited the forward locations along the LoC and issued a statement stressing “national consensus” on the Kashmir issue and reaffirmed the army’s commitment to the Kashmir cause. And on May 1,2008, in an address to the Pakistan-administered Azad (free) Kashmuir’s joint session of the Legislative Assembly and the Legislative Council in Muzaffarabad, Gilani assured the members that there would be no compromise on Kashmir and that his Government was seeking “result oriented” talks with India. On July 12, 2008, in a lecture at the Brooking Institution in Washington DC, Foreign Minister Qureshi said that India and Pakistan “have to look at innovative ways of resolution

28 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL ON WORLD PEACE

VOL. XXVII NO. 1 MARCH 2010

This content downloaded from ������������154.59.124.232 on Tue, 15 Sep 2020 01:27:55 UTC�������������

All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

THE KASHMIR CONFLICT: WHY IT DEFIES SOLUTION

to the Kashmir Issue beyond the CBM by ‘looking outside the box’.” He pointed out that Pakistan had shown “flexibility.”47

Meanwhile, perhaps to scuffle the peace process, for the first time after

the ceasefire agreement of2003 has been signed, in late July 2008 skirmishes

along the LoC flared up between the Indian and Pakistan troops in which four Pakistani soldiers and one Indian soldier were killed. India blamed the

Pakistani army for this provocation. On July 13 a suicide bomber attacked the Indian embassy in Kabul, Afghanistan in which 60 Afghans and four Indian diplomats were killed. India’s National Security Advisor M.K. Naray anan openly accused the Pakistan’s ISI as being behind the bombing and stated that it should be destroyed. President Karazai also implicated the ISI for the attack prompting President Bush to ask the Gilani government to investigate although Pakistani defense minister Chaudhary Ahmed Mukhtar

denied any involvement.48 In early August mmmmm^mmmtmmmmmmmmmmmm^

2008 Gilani, while attending the South India’s National security Asian Association Regional (SAARC) advisor M.K. Narayanan summit in Colombo Sri Lanka, pledged openly accused the to Dr. Singh that he would investigate Pakistan’s |S| as being the Kabul incident and do everything to behjnd the bombjng and put the India-Pakistan dialogue process – – j -. ^ – . , . . \ t i i i , Tox stated that it should be back on track, while the ISI was trying to . – . undermine relations49 These episodes and y rising internal turmoil in Pakistan with coincidental terrorist attacks by a shadowy new group known as Indian Mujahideen in India impeded the peace talks for more than six months.

On September 7, 2008, Zardari was elected President after Gen. Musharraf was forced to resign on August 20. Following his election, on September 10, Zardari declared there would be soon “good news” on Kashmir which set off a cross border guessing game, as he did not explain what he meant.50 While attending the UN General Assembly session in New York City, Zardari met Dr. Singh on September 24, 2008 and embraced him and spoke to him in their native language, Punjabi, calling him the “founder of modern India.” They pledged to renew their co-operation to fight terror and agreed also to launch the fifth round of the composite dialogue within three months.51 He is the first Pakistani leader to refer the Kashmiri militants as “terrorists,”52 while the other Pakistani leaders call

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL ON WORLD PEACE VOL. XXVII NO. 1 MARCH 2010 29

This content downloaded from ������������154.59.124.232 on Tue, 15 Sep 2020 01:27:55 UTC�������������

All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

THE KASHMIR CONFLICT: WHY IT DEFIES SOLUTION

them “freedom fighters.” To the disgust of the army, Zardari violated the army’s long-standing nuclear doctrine by offering a “no first strike use” nuclear weapons agreement that India welcomed. But Zardari had to take

a quick u-turn on the offer after Gen. Kiyani reportedly rebuked him.53 Although the Pakistani army continued to maintain an unfriendly posture,

the Singh government and the Gilani Zardari government genuinely began to move toward a rapprochement. But surprise horrendous terror attacks by the Pakistan-based terrorist on the city of Mumbai November 26-29, 2008, brought Indo-Pakistan relations to their nadir, and doomed the prospects of resolving the Kashmir conflict.

Zadari is the first Pakistani leader to refer to the Kashmiri militants as “terrorists,” while the other Pakistani leaders call them “freedom fighters.”

The Mumbai Terror Attacks November 26-29, 2008; From Tense to Cold Relations

Ten terrorists boarded a merchant ship at Karachi port. En route to their destination they changed ships and arrived in Gateway, Mumbai, on November 26, 2008. Then they stole taxi cabs, and rode in five teams of two to launch their vicious and dastardly attacks on their intended targets.

They first shot commuter train passengers at CS railway terminus, and thereafter moved into the Oberoi-Trident hotel complex, Taj Mahal Palace, the Cama Children’s Hospital, the Jewish Center in the Nariman home, and the Leopold Cafe, and they took the visitors and occupants there hos tage, singled out Britons, Americans, and Jews, and began shooting them indiscriminately. As the city police could not flush out these motivated, determined, and disciplined terrorists, the Indian elite national security guards flew in to battle them. It was only after 60 hours of battling the ter

rorists that they were struck and hostages released. The one lone terrorist named Mohammad Ajmal Amir Imam “Kasab” was captured alive after he was wounded in a shoot out with the police. The tragic episode ended on November 29. In this terror attack, 150 people were wounded and 171 Indians and others were killed including six Americans, three Britons, and Rabbi Gabriel Holzberg and his wife Rivka.

30 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL ON WORLD PEACE

VOL. XXVII NO. 1 MARCH 2010

This content downloaded from ������������154.59.124.232 on Tue, 15 Sep 2020 01:27:55 UTC�������������

All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

THE KASHMIR CONFLICT: WHY IT DEFIES SOLUTION

Amir Kasab has admitted a connection with the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LET) in Pakistan. As suspected, he told his interrogators that he was from the village of Faridkot in Punjab, Pakistan, and born of poor parents with a fourth grade education. He confessed that he, along with nine other ter rorists, was recruited and trained for more than one year by army men under the patronage of its founder, Hafez Mohammad Saeed, (who later founded the Jamat-Ul-Dawah (JUD) after LET was banned in 2002), and its commanders Zaki-Ur Rehman Lakhvi, Zaraar Shah, and Yusuf Muzam

mil on how to use explosives, grenades, AK-47s, and what targets they should hit. The investigators found the cell and satellite phones that the terrorists used, indicating that they had constant communication with the LET operatives in Pakistan. The police published the pictures of the other gunmen with reference to their age, place of residence, etc., in the Indian newspapers showing evidence beyond any shadow of a doubt that they were all from Pakistan. The lone terrorist Jamal

Kasab later confessed his involvement by implicating the LET, and others, before the special court presided over by judge

M.L.Tahilaani.54 Thereafter, the sched uled composite dialogue with Pakistan was immediately suspended by India, and relations turned hostile bordering on war between the two countries.

The Indian External Affairs Minister Mukherjee, on December 4, warned that India was taking the “strongest measures” to ensure there was “no repetition of such acts,” describing the attacks as the “most vicious in the history of independent India.” He expected Pakistan to honor its “solemn commitments and not to permit the use of its soil for terrorism against her neighbors.” He, however, disavowed any military option. The Gilani government responded by saying that it seeks “friendly relations,” and does not seek war, but, if provoked, it said that its forces will defend its sovereignty. Based on unconfirmed reports that India had given Paki stan a deadline of December 26 to return some 20-40 alleged terrorists and fearing an attack by India, Pakistan withdrew some of its troops from the western Afghanistan front and redeployed them on the eastern front

Amir Kasab has admitted a connection with the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LET) in Pakistan. As suspected, he told his interrogators that he was from the village of Faridkot in Punjab, Pakistan.

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL ON WORLD PEACE VOL. XXVII NO. 1 MARCH 2010 31

This content downloaded from ������������154.59.124.232 on Tue, 15 Sep 2020 01:27:55 UTC�������������

All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

THE KASHMIR CONFLICT: WHY IT DEFIES SOLUTION

with India, to the displeasure of the Bush administration. Mr. Mukherjee characterized Pakistan’s behavior as diversionary.

On December 5, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, accompanied by Admiral Mike Mullen, Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, visited both India and Pakistan and asked Pakistan to cooperate with India in locat ing the non-state actors in Pakistan and punishing the guilty. She told the Pakistani leadership that it was responsible as its territory was allegedly used

by non-state actors. Prime Minister Gordon Brown of Great Britain, who visited India and Pakistan on December 15, asked the Pakistani leadership to cooperate with India in locating the culprits. It was time for action, he said. He bluntly told Zardari that three quarters of those who were involved

in serious plots in England were of Pakistani ethnic background and had ties to AI Qaeda in Pakistan. In view of the fact that citizens of 22 foreign nations were affected by this attack, on December 12, the UN Security Council passed a resolution imposing sanctions on four leaders belonging to the LET/JUD, and the Jaish-e-Mohammad (JEM). In response, Pakistani authorities put some of these leaders under house arrest and reportedly seized their assets.

Pressured by the international community and India’s coercive diplo macy, the Gilani government finally appointed the Federal Investigation Agency (FLA) under the auspices of its interior minister, Rehman Malik. Mr. Rehman also admitted that police took into custody six of the eight conspirators of the attack including Zaki-ur-Rehman, Zarar Shah, Hamad Amin Sadiq, and Javed Iqbal. Meanwhile, New Delhi prepared a dossier of evidence, and delivered it to Pakistan implicating 35 persons belonging to the LET in the attack. In response, Pakistan sent New Delhi a 30-point questionnaire prepared by its FI A. On March 13, India handed over its response to clarifications sought by Pakistan to Pakistan’s High Commis sioner, Shahid Malik, in New Delhi, by enclosing a plethora of primary documents running into 400 pages implicating the LET. India, however, did not implicate the Gilani government, but it did implicate the ISI. In fact,

on February 6,2009, India’s foreign secretary, Shivashanker Menon, in an address to the Institute Francais de Relations, Paris, openly charged Pakistan that the organizers of the plot “were and remain clients and creations of the ISI.”55 The lone terrorist Azmal has admitted that some of those who trained

them had military background, especially a major general named Sahab. But

32 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL ON WORLD PEACE

VOL. XXVII NO. 1 MARCH 2010

This content downloaded from ������������154.59.124.232 on Tue, 15 Sep 2020 01:27:55 UTC�������������

All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

THE KASHMIR CONFLICT: WHY IT DEFIES SOLUTION

despite submitting clarifications by India about the accomplices, the Gilani government, as of this writing, has not conducted any trial of the indicted

personnel. Pakistan continues to ask India for more evidence and clarifica tions again and again. India considers the queries as diversionary tactics. It remains to be seen if the Gilani-Zardari government has the courage to try and convict those implicated in the attack given the ISI involvement.

India declared a “pause” on restarting the composite dialogue until the guilty parties were punished, while the Zardari government desperately

seeks talks.56 As Dr. Stephen Cohen noted, the terrorists committed a “bril

liant stupidity” in unraveling the peace process. The army, which became an unpopular institution under the Musharraf

regime following the Mumbai attacks, regained its ground as Pakistani citi zens rallied behind it in the face of India’s alleged threats. The army could conveniently use this conflict with India to ???mmmammmm^H^m^l^B^

deflect citizen’s attention from its alleged The army whjch became

comply an unpopu|ar institution Sanger, in his book entitled The Inheri- , , Lnn^ i i ^ta under the Musharraf tance (2009), points out that the CIA . bugged telephone conversations of the rj|^’J^!6 ?u ?aWin9 Pakistani generals including Gen. Mush- the Mumbai attacks, arraf and Gen. Kiyani, in which they called re9ained ?*s ground as the Taliban a “strategic asset for Pakistan Pakistani citizens rallied in fighting its enemy, India.”57 As already behind it in the face of noted earlier, unlike the Gilani/Zardari India’s alleged threats, government, the military has an interest ^ma^mmmmmmt^mmmmmmm^ in keeping the Kashmir conflict aflame to justify its dominance in Pakistani domestic politics. It never wants to submit itself to civilian authority.

PLEDGE TO RESTART THE COMPOSITE DIALOGUE

Six months after the Mumbai assault occurred, for the first time, on June

17, 2009, Dr. Singh and Zardari met on margins of the summit of the Shanghai Cooperationorganization (SCO) held in Yekaterinburg, Russia and broke the dialogue logjam when they agreed to renew talks at foreign secretary levels. However, the mild mannered Dr. Singh was blunt with Zardari when he told him in front of the media that Paksistan should not

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL ON WORLD PEACE VOL. XXVII NO. 1 MARCH 2010 33

This content downloaded from ������������154.59.124.232 on Tue, 15 Sep 2020 01:27:55 UTC�������������

All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

THE KASHMIR CONFLICT: WHY IT DEFIES SOLUTION

allow terrorists to use its soil for terrorism against India. Although Pakistan

found his remark unacceptable, it nonetheless was happy that the meeting had broken the ice.58 Again on July 17, on the sidelines of the summit of the Non-aligned Nations held at Sharm-el-Sheikh, Egyt, Prime Ministers Dr. Singh and Gilani met and, to the delight of Pakistan, the leaders issued a joint statement agreeing to renew the composite dialogue by delinking it from action on terror. The statement also included Gilanis’ controversial

mentioning “some information on threat in Balochistan” implying obliquely

that India may have a hand in the separatist movement in that state. They announced that their foreign secretaries would meet as often as necessary and

report to their foreign ministers S.M. Krishna and Shah Mahmood Qureshi of India and Pakistan respectively.59 Because the Prime Mintster reversed his position on terrorism and let Gilani mention Balochistan in the joint statement, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)-National Democratic Alliance (NDA) went berserk and denounced his stand as a sell out.60 On July 29, in his speech in the Lok Sabha (Lower House), Dr. Singh clarified his position saying that he has not diluted his stand on terrorism, and expects Pakistan

to prove its bonafides by action. He stressed the dialogue was only brought forward to achieve peace between the two countries.61

On August 1, the foreign minister Krishna told the Rajya Sabha (upper House) that no progress in dialogue with Pakistan was possible in an atmo sphere vitiated by violence or threat to use violence.62 At the conference of 112 heads of missions held in New Delhi on August 25, Mr. Krishna ruled out a meaningful dialogue with Pakistan until it fulfilled its commitment of completely dismantling the terrorist infrastructutre from its soil as has been

agreed to. As of this writing, no movement toward resolving the Kashmir conflict has beebeen taken by the two governments. On the margins of the

UN General assembly session on September 27,2009, India’s new foreign secretary, Ms. Nirupama Rao, met her counterpart, Salman Bashir, and discussed only the progress Pakistan has made investigating and punishing the accomplices of the Mumbai attacks. And on September 29, Mr. Krishna

met his counterpart Quresh at the UN in New York and told him that the resumption of broad-based dialogue with Pakistan hinged on its prosecution

of all those involved in the attacks.63 Therefore, the prospects of resolving the Kashmir conflict with the Gilani/Zardari government are equally bleak,

although, as a democracy, it initially produced a lot of euphoria in India.

34 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL ON WORLD PEACE

VOL. XXVII NO. 1 MARCH 2010

This content downloaded from ������������154.59.124.232 on Tue, 15 Sep 2020 01:27:55 UTC�������������

All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

THE KASHMIR CONFLICT: WHY IT DEFIES SOLUTION

The Gilani/Zardari government faces a myriad of political, economic, social, and military problems making it very weak and fragile. Withdrawal

of the PML (N) from coalition only further added to its fragility With the 17th amendment still intact, Zardari as president remains a powerful leader

endowed with the same extraordinary powers as those Gen. Musharraf had. The parliament is not sovereign yet without doing away with the 17th amendment. Zardari attained notoriety as “Mr. Ten Percent” for his alleged extraction of 10 percent bribes on government contracts while serving as a

minister in his wife’s cabinet. (He was imprisoned for eleven years although he was not convicted.) He has become a very unpopular leader with an approval rating at about 19 percent. Structural reforms which the country badly needed to overcome this economic crisis have not been introduced. Gilani and Zardari themselves are feudal ^mmmmmm m^m^t^mm

lords who are incapable of initiating The Gi,ani/Zardari badly needed land reforms. It is bailed . , ., ., j, . , r i government faces a out with aid and loans received from the . . US, the IMF, and Friends of Pakistan. myr,ad ?f Pollt,cal’ The $7 billion in economic aid approved economic, social, and by the US Congress in October 2009 for military problems ^ a five-year period for infrastructure may making it very fragile, certainly help the country provided it is l?l IB ll^””””ll^ B” not diverted for other purposes.

Terrorism by Pakistani Taliban and Al-Qeda has increased, threaten ing the very fabric of the nation. The Jihadists who started their terrorist attacks in early 2007 under the Musharraf regime have intensified them, especially suicide bombings. The deadly brazen wave of attacks launched by an alliance of Pakistani Taliban, AI Qaeda and Jihadi groups of Southern Punjab in October 2009 in various places, especially police and military installations, vividly show how audacious and powerful these groups have become and how shaky and vulnerable the Gilani government has become. For example, on October 6, a suicide bomber struck the lobby of the UN Food Program office in Islamabad and killed all five of its employees. On October 10 an explosion at a crowded market in the northwestern city of Peshawar (NWFP) killed 42 and wounded over 60 innocent civilians. On October 11, to the embarrassment of the military, four militants dressed in army fatigues entered its headquarters and took 42 hostages. Pakistani

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL ON WORLD PEACE VOL. XXVII NO. 1 MARCH 2010 35

This content downloaded from ������������154.59.124.232 on Tue, 15 Sep 2020 01:27:55 UTC�������������

All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

THE KASHMIR CONFLICT: WHY IT DEFIES SOLUTION

commandos had to rescue them, killing seven men including the mili tants. On October 13, a suicide car bomber attacked a military vehicle in a crowded Alpuri market in the Shangla district in the Swatt Valley, a sup posedly liberated area of Taliban militants, killing 41 people and wounding dozens more. And on October 16, in coordinated attacks, three groups of militants dressed in police uniforms simultaneously attacked three law enforcement agencies in the city of Lahore, the cultural center, and the capital, in which more than 30 people were killed including 19 police offi cers and 11 militants as commandos fired on the militants. On October

17, three suicide bombers, including a female one, attacked a police station in Peshawar killing more than 11 people. Terrorists did not spare even an Islamic university in Islamabad when two suicide bombers attacked it, killing

four people including a female student on October 21. These attacks are not

only aimed at discouraging the military offensive against South Wazirstan,

the hot bed of Taliban and AI Qaeda, but also presumably, as Hakimullah Mehsud has declared, to establish an Islamic state in Pakistan by remov ing the current government. Mehsud seeks to fight India after this goal is achieved. However, troops did move into South Wazirstan, and it remains to be seen if the army will be able to dismantle terrorist infrastructure and

its threat.64 In addition, separatist armed struggle is raging in Balochistan,

especially after its leader Nawab Akbar Bugti was killed in August 2005 by the military at the orders of Gen. Musharraf, although the government falsely accused the Indian government for this ongoing movement.65 The government appears helpless and impotent in addressing these problems. The Gilani government is losing its political legitimacy.

The military continues to play a dominant role in the country’s politics with little interest in submitting itself to civilian authority. As noted earlier,

the military and the ISI continue to support the Pakistan-based militants including the Taliban as strategic assets to fight India, despite the fact that the Gilani-Zardari government opposes this strategy. India’s accusation of Pakistan’s military support for terrorism was finally acknowledged by Zardari on July 9,2009 when he told the retired civil servants that militant

groups were “created and deliberately nurtured” as a policy for “short-term tactical objectives.”66

No wonder on July 25, 2009 in Dubai, the US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mike Mullen, made a damning indictment of

36 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL ON WORLD PEACE

VOL. XXVII NO. 1 MARCH 2010

This content downloaded from ������������154.59.124.232 on Tue, 15 Sep 2020 01:27:55 UTC�������������

All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

THE KASHMIR CONFLICT: WHY IT DEFIES SOLUTION

the ISI by saying that it was fomenting “chaotic activity” in Kashmir and Afghanistan. He hoped that “in the long run the ISI has to change its stra tegic thrust.”67 The suicide bomb attack near the Indian embassy in Kabul on October 8, 2009 in which 17 people were killed and over 80 injured was claimed credit by the Pakistan Taliban headed by Hakimullah Mehsud for the blast. However, Afghanistan and India blamed the Pakistani army and the ISI which want to undermine Indian-Afghan friendly relations and force India to leave Afghanistan.68

And to the dismay of India, the LET after its involvement in the Mumbai

attack largely remains intact, robust and is determined to strike India again

and the ISI continues to maintain its ties with the outfit belying Pakistan’s

commitment to dismantle it.69 No wonder Dr. Singh expressed the same concern about the pervasive jihadi threat ^mm?mammmmmmmmmmmmam*

from Pakistan. On August 18, inaugurat- The military in general, ing the Chief Minister’s conference on ancj the ISI in particular, internal security in New Delhi, the Prime wou|d \\ke to keep the

Minister warned the heads that there was Kashmir conflict aflame “credible information of ongoing plans jn ^ tQ majntajn |ts of terrorist groups in Pakistan to carry . . n – ^ r i i ^7n^ni i dominance in Pakistani out fresh attacks. 70 The military in gen- . eral and the ISI in particular (which has _”_ become a state within a state) would like to keep the Kashmir conflict aflame in order to maintain its dominance in Pakistani politics. For example, on July 3, in his meeting with Indian defense advisors of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, Lt. Gen. Shuja Pasha asserted that the ISI and the Pakistan army were involved in framing Pakistan’s India

policy along with the Foreign Office and, therefore, he wanted India to deal directly with these three institutions including the army and the ISI although it is in breach of a diplomatic protocol to do so.71

Notwithstanding Dr. Singh’s pledge, his government is hesitant to renew the composite dialogue until the Gilani government has produced some tangible results in punishing the conspirators of the Mumbai attack. But as India’s Home Minister P. Chidambaram told NDTV network on

September 7,2009, India does not rule out the involvement of state actors such as the ISI.72 If that is true, Gilani may never be able to try and convict

the culprits, as the ISI is likely to resist. This may lead to a death knell to

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL ON WORLD PEACE VOL. XXVII NO. 1 MARCH 2010 37

This content downloaded from ������������154.59.124.232 on Tue, 15 Sep 2020 01:27:55 UTC�������������

All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

THE KASHMIR CONFLICT: WHY IT DEFIES SOLUTION

the dialogue as India insists on punishment of the conspirators as a condi tion to restart the dialogue.

Therefore, in light of problems cited above facing the Gilani-Zardari government, one wonders if it will be in a position to reach an amicable settlement with India on Kashmir. India may be averse to deal with such

a fragile and shaky regime which is at a crippling point. But what is the solution to the conflict when circumstances permit the Gilani/Zardari government supported by its military to make a genuine commitment in resolving the Kashmir conflict?

POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS TO THE KASHMIR CONFLICT

There are many alternative solutions suggested to resolving the Kashmir conflict in terms of their pros and cons. Given the space constraints here

below, we simply identify some of them and suggest the one that India, and the Kashmiri Muslims could agree to if Pakistan is willing to compromise. Raju Thomas and Sumit Ganguly suggest the following alternative solutions:

1. Maintain the territorial status quo in Kashmir along the LoC. 2. Secure Kashmir’s accession to Pakistan.

3. Create an independent Kashmir.

4. Secure a “Trieste” solution (like the disputed city of Trieste which was partitioned between Italyand Yugoslavia) by territorial transfer of the Vale of Kashmir to Pakistan.

5. Manipulate a Tibetan solution by transforming the demographics in Kashmir (as China allegedly reduced the Tibetan population into a minority by settlingTibet with its Han Chinese, so should India with Hindus and Sikhs in the Valley).

6. Generate an exodus of Kashmiri Muslims into Pakistan through repressive or persuasive measures.

7. Achieve joint Indo-Pakistani control over Kashmir.

8. Foster a subcontinent of several independent states. 9. Promote a decentralized sub-continental confederation of several

autonomous states.

38 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL ON WORLD PEACE

VOL. XXVII NO. 1 MARCH 2010

This content downloaded from ������������154.59.124.232 on Tue, 15 Sep 2020 01:27:55 UTC�������������

All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

THE KASHMIR CONFLICT: WHY IT DEFIES SOLUTION

10. As required by the U.N. Security Council, hold a plebiscite to ascer tain the wishes of Kashmirs.

11. Grant a protectorate status to Kashmir.73

The authors argue that most of these alternative solutions are either impractical or unacceptable to India, Pakistan, and the Kashmiri Muslims, including the militants. Of these solutions the one that Pakistan and the

militants prefer is a plebiscite as has been called for by the UNSC resolu tions. But India considers this option as irrelevant, outdated, and rebus sic stantibus. Even Gen. Musharraf admitted that option is not practical today. A number of Kashmiri militants also oppose the plebiscite, the fact that under the UNSC resolutions they cannot have the option of inde pendence. Therefore, the only possible solution to this festering conflict is the first alternative. That is, maintaining the LoC as the current territorial

status quo with some border adjustment favorable to Pakistan, and by granting a measure of autonomy to both ma^K^mmmmim’^mammm^m^ parts of divided Kashmir. This is what Even with high-handed Prime Minister Jawaharhal Nehru and policies of previous Sheikh Abdullah had agreed to when they Indian governments, the signed the Delhi Accord in 1952.74 Even Kashmiris Still prefer to

Musharraf, as we noted earlier, suggested be with India than with some variation of this arrangement. As Pakistan which has pledged, if India grants autonomy under become almost a “failed Article 370 of the Indian Constitution, s^a^e ” and demilitarizes the state as demanded ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ by separatists, and allocates sufficient funding for the states’ economic development as has been already done by Singh’s Government, one should not be surprised if the militants gave up their insurgency and joined the democratic forces to rebuild their heavily damaged state due to insurgency.

As support for insurgency in Kashmir has declined, the insurgency is declining. In fact, quite a number of Kashmiri militants are returning to Kashmir from Pakistan as they are tired of the unproductive insurgency.75

The self-chosen leaders of the APHC who refused to participate in rounds of talks convened by Dr. Singh pressured by Pakistan, and some militant groups, today, are willing to do so as they are being marginalized in the state

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL ON WORLD PEACE VOL. XXVII NO. 1 MARCH 2010 39

This content downloaded from ������������154.59.124.232 on Tue, 15 Sep 2020 01:27:55 UTC�������������

All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

THE KASHMIR CONFLICT: WHY IT DEFIES SOLUTION

where there has been a functioning democracy since 2003.76 Hindus and Buddists who constitute the majority in Jammu, and Ladhak respectively, and who want to be an integral part of India may accept this deal. Even with high handed policies of previous Indian governments, the Kashmiris still prefer to be with India rather than with Pakistan, which has become almost a “failed state.”

For example, in an opinion poll conducted by the independent UK based Market and Opinion Research International (MORI) in June 2002, 61 percent of Kashmiris said they are better off remaining as part of India

as opposed to 6 percent choosing to be part of Pakistan.77 Moreover, ethni cally and ideologically and religiously, one can argue that Kashmiri Muslims

in the Valley are much more close to India than they are to Pakistan. The Kashmiri Muslims are mostly moderate, eclectic in their religious beliefs and values and have incorporated some aspects of Hindusim and are pre dominantly sufi, which is pacifistic in its theological orientation.78

CONCLUSION

We have first briefly discussed the history of the Kashmir conflict, and the insurgency the conflict produced in 1990, and that continues until today supported by Pakistan. Second, we have looked at the peace process that India and the Musharraf engaged in, and we have offered some explanations why they failed to resolve the Kashmir and other conflicts under the rubric

of composite dialogue. Third, we have explained why India and the Gilani Zardari government may not be able to resolve the conflict. And finally, we have suggested a viable solution to the conflict if and when democratic Pakistan is willing to compromise on the Kashmir conflict.

Notes

1. For a comprehensive discussion of the origins of the conflict and the first Kashmir war, Sisir Gupta, Kashmir, New York: Asia Publishing House, 1966.

2. For a detailed discussion of the war and its leading to the Tashkent Declaration see Victoria Schofield, Kashmir in the Cross Fire, New York: LB. Tauris 1996, pp. 193-206.

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL ON WORLD PEACE 40 VOL. XXVII NO. 1 MARCH 2010

This content downloaded from ������������154.59.124.232 on Tue, 15 Sep 2020 01:27:55 UTC�������������

All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

THE KASHMIR CONFLICT: WHY IT DEFIES SOLUTION

3. For more discussion of the Bangladesh war and its leading to the Simla Accord, see Sumit Ganguly, Conflict Unending: Indian-Pakistan Tensions Since 1947, New York: Columbia University, 2001, pp. 51-78 and 168-169.

4. For a discussion on Sheikh Abdullah and his son’s rule, see Schofield, Kashmir in the Cross Fire, pp. 216-223.

5. For discussion of the insurgency, see Ibid., pp. 230-236.

6. For text of the memorandum see in Ganguly, Conflict Unending, pp. 170-171.

7. For discussion of Gen. Musharaff’s role in engineering the Kargil war and of President Clinton’s role in ending it, see Ibid, Ganguly, pp. 114-129.

8. For discussion about the failure of the Agra summit talks, see Ibid., pp. 135-7.

9. New Tork Times, January 13, 2002.

10. In January-June 2002, India was on the verge of striking terrorist camps in POK, see India Today International, December 23, 2002, pp. 13-19.

11. Ibid., June, 10, 2002, pp. 10-11. 12. For more discussion about the elections, and the Sayeed government’s

policy toward militants, see Ibid., October 21, 2002, pp. 12-18, and November 18, 2002,pp.24-29.

13. Ibid., May 12, 2003, pp. 23-25, and Economist, May 10, 2003, 31-32. 14. For details about the joint statement, see New Tork Times, January 7-8,

2004, and Dawn, January 7, 2004. 15. Hindu, May 13,2007. 16. New Tork Times, November 12, 2004.

17. India Today International, November 29, 2004, p. 8. 18. For details of the initial talks between the Singh’s government and the

Musharraf regime, see Fahmida Ashraf, “India-Pakistan Dialogue under Con gress Government,” at www.Issi.org.pk/journal2004-files/no-3/article/2.htm.

19. For details about the second round of talks, see “A Status Report,” Insti tute of War and Conflict (IPCS), January 31, 2005, pp. 1-3.

20. Hindu, April 18, 2005. 21. Priya shree Andley, “Third Composite Dialogue: An Overview of Indo

Pak Relations in 2006,” IPCS, March 2007, pp. 1-5.

22. For text of the joint statement, see Hindu, September 17, 2006. 23. For more details about the interview, see A.G. Noorani, “There is So

Much to Gain Mutually,” Frontline, Vol 23, No.16, August 2006, pp. 12-25. 24. Hindu, December 7, 2006. 25. Ibid., December 12, and 14, 2006.

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL ON WORLD PEACE VOL. XXVII NO. 1 MARCH 2010 41

This content downloaded from ������������154.59.124.232 on Tue, 15 Sep 2020 01:27:55 UTC�������������

All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

THE KASHMIR CONFLICT: WHY IT DEFIES SOLUTION

26 Ibid., 17,2006. 27. Navina Behera, Demystifying Kashmir, Washington, DC: Brooking Insti

tute, 2006, pp. 54-5,138-141, and 167-169. 28 Ibid., pp. 139-142. 29. For a detailed discussion of these disputes, see Ashutosh Misra, “An

Audit of the India-Pakistan Peace Process,” Australian Journal of International Affairs” vol. 61. no 1. pp. 506-528; Bharat Bushan, “Tulbul, Sir Creek, and Siachen: Competitive Methodologies”, and Ahmed Bilai Soofi,Wuller Barrage, Siachen, and Sir Creek,” South Asian Journal, January-March No 5, 2005 at southasiamedia.net/magazine/journal/7.htm.

30. Hindu, February 3, 2007. 31. Ibid., March 1 2007. 32. Behera, Demystifying Kashmir, pp. 52-53.

33. For details about the Taliban insurgency and Karazai’s accusations of Pakistan, see India Today International, July 31, 2006, pp. 22-24.

34. Nirupama Subramanyam, “Military in Its Businees Business in Pakistan,” Hindu, 19, 2007.

35. Economist, July, 8, 2006, pp. 22-24.

36. Ayesha Siddiqua, Military Inc Inside Pakist Pakistanis Military Economy, London. Pluto Press, 2007, pp. 190-91.

37. India Abroad, June 4, 1999, p. 20. 38. For more discussion about how Gen Musharraf came to powe, and how

he consolidated it, see Rathnam Indurthy, “Explaining Why the Musharraf Mili tary Regime is Not Likely to Restore Democracy in Pakistan,” Asian Profile, vol.34, no. 4., pp. 371-74.

39. For a detailed discussion about Musharaf’s emergency rule and why he subsequendy lifted it, see Hindu, November 4 -6, 2007; December 1, 2007, and December 19, 2007.

40. For a detailed discussion about Ms. Bhutto’s assassination, the citizens’ reaction to her death, and the conclusions of the Scotlan Yard report, see Ibid., December 28-31, 2007; January 5, 2009; January 9, 2008; January 15, 2008; January 21, 2009; February 5, 2009, and February 9, 2009.

41. Cited in Victoria Schofield, Kashmir in the Crossfire, IB Tauris, London, 1996, p. 214.

42. Ibid., pp. 225-35. 43. Cited in India Abroad, June 4, 1999, p. 20.

44. For text of the MOU, see Sumit Ganguly, Conflict Unending, Woodrow Wison Center Press, Washington, DC:. 2001. 170-71.

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL ON WORLD PEACE 42 VOL. XXVII NO. 1 MARCH 2010

This content downloaded from ������������154.59.124.232 on Tue, 15 Sep 2020 01:27:55 UTC�������������

All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

THE KASHMIR CONFLICT: WHY IT DEFIES SOLUTION

45. For details about Mukherjee’s visit, See G. Parthasarathy, “Symbolism Amid Turmoil,” The Hindu Business Line, May 11, 2008, at the hindubusiness line.com/2008/05/09.

46. For text of the joint statement, see at meaa.nic.in/ pressrelease/2008/05/21js02.htm.

47. For details about differing positions of Pakistani leaders, see Hindu March 3, 2008, May 1, 2008, May 11, 2008, and July 13, 2008.

48. For details about the cease-fire violations, the Kabul attack, and their impact on Indo-Pakistan relations, see Hindu, July 13-14, 2008; July 16-17, 2008; July 31, 2008, and August 5, 2008.

49. Ibid., August 3, 2008, and August 5, 2008. 50. Ibid, September 10, 2008, and September 11, 2008. 51. India Abroad, October 3, 2008, pp. A5, and A9. 52. Hindu October 6, 2008, and October 7, 2008. 53. India Today International, December 22, 2008, p. 8.

54. For more details about the attack, see India Today International, Janu ary 5, 2009, pp. 18-31, and India Abroad, July 31, 2009, pp. A-A6.

55. For a detailed discussion about Indo-Pakistan relations in the aftermath

of the terrorist attack, see, Hindu January 1, 2009; February 4, 2009; February 6, 2009; February 10, 2009; February 13-16, 2009; February 20, 2009; Febru ary 26-27, 2009; March 1-2, 2009; March 4, 2009; March 7, 2009; March 12, 2009, and March 14, 2009.

56. Ibid., March 13, 2007.

57. The book excerpts are cited in “Why the US Bugged the Pakistan Army,” Asian Times, February, 16, 2009.

58. Hindu, June 17, 2009, and June 18, 2009.

59. For text of the joint statement, see Islamicterrorism.wordpress. com/2009/18.

60. Hindu, July 18,2009. 61. Ibid., July 30, 2009. 62. Ibid., August 1.2009. 63. Ibid., October 27, 2009, and October 29, 2009. 64. For more detail about these terrorist attacks, and government response,

see New Tork Times, October 6, 2009; October 10, 2009; October 11, 2009; October 13, 2009; October 16, 2009; October 17, 2009; October 17, 2009; October 18, 2009, October 22, 2009, and Hindu, October 16, 2009.

65. For more discussion about the secessionist movement, see Malik Siraj Akbar, “Balochistan Situation 28, Getting Bleaker by the Day,” Hindu,

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL ON WORLD PEACE VOL. XXVII NO. 1 MARCH 2010 43

This content downloaded from ������������154.59.124.232 on Tue, 15 Sep 2020 01:27:55 UTC�������������

All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

THE KASHMIR CONFLICT: WHY IT DEFIES SOLUTION

September 2, 2009, and Hamid Mir, “India and the Baloch Insurgency,” Ibid., July 2009.

66. Ibid., August 25, 2009. 67. Ibid., July 9, 2009. 68. Ibid., October 9-11, 2009. 69. New Tork Times, September 30, 2009.

70. Ibid., July 25, 2009. 71. Ibid., July 18,2009. 72. Ibid., September 7, 2009. 73. Ibid., July, 23, 2009.

74. Raju Thomas (ed), Perspectives on Kashmir: The Roots of Conflict in South Asia, Boulder, CO: Worldview Press, 1992, pp. 30-34, and Sumit Ganguly, The Crisis of Kashmir: Portents of War, and Hopes of Peace, Woodrow Wilson Center, Washington, D.C., pp. 133-150.

75. For details about the 1952 accord, see Sumantra Bose, Kashmir Roots of Conflict: Paths to Peace, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003.

76. Praveen Swami, “The Hurriyat’s Moment of Decision,” Hindu, Septem ber 5, 2009.

77. Cited in India Abroad, June 4, 2002, p. 6.

78. For discussion about the cultural affinity of Kashmiri Muslims with Indians, see Rathnam Indurthy, “Kashmir in Indo-Paksistan Relations: Mutual Claims to the State as Causes of the Conflict” Asian Profile, vol. 30, no.l, Febru ary 2002, pp. 54-59; and Praveen Swami, “The Hurriyat’s Moment of Decision,”

Hindu, September 5, 2009. Cited in India Abroad, June 4, 2002, p. 6.

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL ON WORLD PEACE 44 VOL. XXVII NO. 1 MARCH 2010

This content downloaded from ������������154.59.124.232 on Tue, 15 Sep 2020 01:27:55 UTC�������������

All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms